This article examines the impact of the aggregate development aid supplied by donors at the aggregate level of remittances sent from donor-countries. The empirical analysis focuses on 22 donor-countries over the period 2000-2015. It uses instrumental variables approaches and provide evidence that donors' overall aid supply could be substitute or complementary with remittances paid flows, depending on the level of remittances sent from donor-countries, as well as on the share of migrants' stock on the total population of the host-country.
Introduction
In light of the importance of migrants' remittances for beneficiaries in home countries of migrants, many studies have been conducted on migrants' remittances, in terms of both their determinants and their impact on the receiving economies. Specifically, the studies on the determinants of remittances have put emphasis on the macroeconomic and microeconomics factors that influence migrants' remittances received. These studies have either used aggregate data to analyse the determinants of remittances by relying on a framework of country/year or they have used a bilateral setting, i.e., country-pair 1 /year to conduct the analysis. Among the identified macroeconomic factors that explain the amount of migrants' remittances received are the number of workers, the wage rates, the economic situation in the host country of the migrants, the economic situation in the migrants' country of origin, the exchange rate in the home country of migrants, the relative interest rate between the sending and the recipient countries, the institutional quality as well as some demographic and financial/political characteristics in the recipient-country (e.g., El-Sakka & McNabb, 1999; Freund and Spatafora, 2005; Gupta, 2005; Schiopu and Siegried, 2006; Chami et al, 2008; Adams, 2009) . However, the bulk of these studies have focused on the amount of remittances received in the migrants' countries of origin, and insufficient attention has been paid to the determinants (at the aggregate level) of the amount of remittances sent from the countries of destination of migrants, in particular developed countries.
At the same time, developed countries are known as the major providers of development aid flows (also known as official development aid, i.e., ODA) to developing countries, including poorest ones, with a view to promoting development in these countries. In recent years, very few studies, notably Bertoli et al. (2008) and Fuchs et al. (2014) have, in their investigation of the determinants of donors' ODA supply, explored whether the aggregate amount of remittances paid (i.e., the total amount of remittances sent from these donor-countries, i.e., developed countries) substitute or complement ODA. Both have obtained that remittances do not exert a significant impact on donors' overall aid supply: Bertoli et al. (2008) have proxied remittances by the share of immigrant population on the country's total population, and Fuchs et al. (2014) have used workers' remittances and compensation of non-resident employees paid (i.e., sent from donor-countries) -henceforth referred to as remittances paid -in their respective analysis. Nonetheless, these authors have recognized the possibility of reverse causality from ODA to remittances, i.e., ODA could in turn influence remittances paid.
The current article aims to complement the above-mentioned studies that have focused on remittances received by looking now at the side of countries from which remittances are sent (development aid donor-countries), and examine whether such a reverse causality from ODA to remittances exists. In other words, the article investigates, at the aggregate level, the impact of donors' aid on remittances paid, i.e., whether donors' development aid complements or substitutes to remittances sent from donor-countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on this matter, as other studies have looked at the subject from the perspective of aid and remittances received by recipient-countries. The article argues that the impact of development aid on remittances paid would take place through its impact on migration. The analysis is conducted on a sample of 21 donor-countries over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] , based on data availability. Figures 1 and 2 provide a first glimpse on the relationship between development aid flows i.e., the Net Aid Transfers, in percentage of donor-countries' Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (denoted "NAT") and remittances paid, in percentage of donorcountries' GDP ("REMIT"). Data used represent the average on the 21 donor-countries over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] . Specifically, Figure 1 presents the evolution over 2000-2015 of both types of capital flows, while Figure 2 displays the cross-plot between these two types of capital flows. Figure 1 shows that both Net Aid Transfers and remittances paid have evolved more or less in the same direction over the period. Net Aid transfers moved from 0.33% in 2000 to 0.46% in 2015, whereas remittances paid (% GDP) evolved from 0.46% in 2000 to 0.69% in 2015. Hence, this Figure clearly shows that the amount of remittances sent from donor-countries has always exceeded the amount of aid supplied by donors. Turning to Figure 2 , the left-hand side graph shows the correlation pattern between NAT and REMIT, where the natural logarithm has not been applied to these variables. The right-hand side graph presents the correlation pattern between NAT and REMIT, where the natural logarithm has been applied to the two variables. The application of the natural Logarithm to these two variables in the right-hand side graph aims to show that it helps address the outliers observed in the left-hand side graph. Both graphs show a positive correlation pattern between NAT and REMIT. However, the right-hand side graph seems to indicate that they may be some outliers, which include countries where remittances paid (% GDP) are higher than 1% [(= exponential (0)], and where remittances paid (% GDP) are lower than 0.135% [(= exponential (-2) ]. The empirical exercise will duly take into account the possible effects of these outliers.
The empirical analysis uses the instrumental variables approach and shows evidence that the effect of net aid transfers on remittances paid depends on the level of remittances-to-GDP ratio sent from donor-countries to migrants' countries of origin, as well as on the share of migrants' stock in the host-country's total population.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses from a theoretical perspective how donors' aid could influence remittances paid. Section 3 presents the model that would help examine empirically the impact of ODA on remittances paid, and discusses the empirical strategy. Section 4 interprets the empirical results. Section 5 undertakes a robustness check analysis. Section 6 concludes.
Discussion on the theoretical impact of donors' aid on remittances paid
Recent years have witnessed a great attention to the relationship between migration and aid. For example, further to the recent surge of migrants flows from developing countries towards donor-countries, the political statements 2 made by development aid donors, including the European Union or European individual countries, tend to the reflect the fact that development aid would substitute to migration. As we will see below, the literature on the relationship between development aid and migration is still inconclusive as to the sign of this impact. In the current article, we argue that the development aid provided by donors would influence remittances sent from donor-countries (remittances paid) through its impact on migration flows. In particular, we expect that development aid could induce higher migration flows, and hence higher remittances paid, all other things being equal. Similarly, development aid could induce lower migration flows and consequently lower remittances paid, all other things being equal.
Concerning the related-literature, there is from a theoretical perspective no direct link between development aid and migration, as development aid is expected to influence migration through its indirect effects on the determinants of migration. Additionally, the influence of development aid flows on migration flows is subject to opposite forces so that its net impact is a priori unknown (Parsons and Winters, 2014; Berthélemy et al., 2009 ). The hump-shaped pattern hypothesis between receiving countries' development level (proxied by their real per capita income) and migration flows has been put forth in the literature to explain how development aid could affect migration flows (see for example, Schiff, 1994; Hatton and Williamson, 2002; Adam and Page, 2003; Faini and Venturini, 1993; Berthélemy et al., 2009; and Clemens, 2014 for this hump-shaped hypothesis). This hypothesis combines two major, but opposite channels through which development aid could influence migration, including the income channel and the budgetary constraint channel. According to humpshaped hypothesis, for relatively low levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, migration is positively associated with GDP per capita. For relatively higher levels of GDP per capita, migration is negatively correlated with GDP per capita. In other words, when initial income is low, a rise in this income induces higher migration flows, while the opposite is true for higher levels of income. This income channel suggests that by raising households' disposable income (but not necessarily the economy-wide growth rates), development aid would discourage people from emigrating and hence, reduce emigration. On the other hand, the budgetary constraint channel posits that development aid could influence the impact of additional wealth on financing migration costs for a larger share of the population in the countries of origin. In other words, loosening budget constraints makes migration more feasible. The combination of these two channels could lead to the situation where at very low levels of income per capita, the budgetary constraint channel dominates the income channel, as development aid could generate higher migration flows by allowing poor migrants to afford the migration costs. However, as the income per capita rises, the income channel progressively dominates the budgetary constraint channel.
More recently, Berthélemy et al. (2009) have demonstrated that bilateral aid could influence migration flows through the 'attraction effect'. The authors postulate that higher bilateral aid to a recipientcountry intensifies the donor-country's attractiveness for citizens of this recipient-country. This is because aid policy implementation facilitates bilateral contacts and increases the information concerning the donor-country (including on labor market conditions) available to potential migrants of the recipient-country. In turn, this additional information would reduce the transaction costs attached to the considered migration flows, and hence induce higher migration flows.
On the empirical front, the results have shown mixed evidence. Faini and Venturini (1993) have tested empirically the hypothesis that income growth may fail to reduce emigration because it relaxes credit-constraints, which tend to be especially binding in poorer contexts. Hence, in their hypothesis, the budgetary constraint channel dominates the income channel. By using migration data for Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey, the authors have obtained empirical support for this hypothesis. Berthélemy et al. (2009) have reported strong empirical evidence that both bilateral aid and recipients' total aid exert a positive and significant impact on migrant stocks. In a more recent study, Lanati and Thiele (2017) have obtained a negative and significant impact of bilateral aid on emigration rates, including for the poorer half of recipient countries. The authors therefore conclude that the budgetary constraints channel does not play a significant role in shaping migration decisions. Furthermore, their empirical analysis has revealed that the negative impact of development aid on the emigration rate is higher when recipientcountries are in conflict situations. Thus, it is not clear whether development aid influences positively or negatively migration flows. However, the current study is looking into the impact of aggregate development aid supplied by donors on the remittances sent from donor-countries, and not on migration flows to donor-countries. Thus, while migration flows could be an important factor explaining the impact of development aid supplied by donors on remittances sent from donor-countries, they might not be necessarily the only factor that matter. While the value of remittances sent from donor-countries would reflect the volume of migrants in these donor-countries, this value is surely not equivalent to the number of migrants in donorcountries. This is because the value of remittances depends not only on the number of migrants in the donor-countries, but also on other factors such as the wages of remitters, and the real effective exchange rate at which the money (remittances) is sent. For example, all things being equal, compared to donor-countries where migrants' earnings are relatively low, donor-countries with a low number of migrants and with higher earnings could send an important amount of remittances to their home-countries. Another channel through which it development aid could influence remittances paid is through distant feeling of the existing migrants to the friends and families left in their home countries, which can be described as lost channel of communication. This would likely lead to lower remittances paid. Overall, the key issue is how development aid supplied by donors responds to these remittances paid. From a theoretical perspective, and in light of the discussion laid out above, it would be difficult to anticipate whether donors' aggregate aid supply would influence positively or negatively remittances paid.
Model specification and econometric strategy

Model specification
To investigate empirically how donors' aid supply influences remittances paid, we postulate the following model:
where i is the subscript associated with a country; t denotes the timeperiod. The panel dataset used in the analysis contains 21 countries 3 over the annual period 2000-2015. The panel dataset has been constructed on the basis of data availability. 0 to 6 are parameters to be estimated. are countries' fixed effects; is a well-behaving error term.
The dependent variable "REMIT" stands for the remittances paid, in percentage of the donor-country's GDP.
The development aid variable is measured by the Net Aid Transfers (denoted "NAT"), which according to Dang et al., (2013) approximates more closely the current budgetary outlays associated with development aid. The "NAT" is calculated by subtracting from gross official development assistance the repayments of principal, interest payments and the cancellation of non-ODA loans (i.e., debt relief). The exclusion of debt relief from the definition of aid is justified by the fact that debt cancellation does not give rise to an actual disbursement of funds and may even imply a double counting of aid if the debt that is cancelled was granted on a concessional basis.
Control variables include the real per capita income ("GDPC") of a donor-country; the depth of financial development ("FINDEV") in a donor-country; the real effective exchange rate ("REER") prevailing in a donor-country; the unemployment rate ("UR") in a donor-country; and the share of the stock of migrants in the total population ("STOCKMGR") in a donor-country. The description and source of each of these variables are provided in Appendix 1. The standard descriptive statistics on these variables are reported in Appendix 2.
Following the literature on the macroeconomic determinants of remittances (e.g., El-Sakka & McNabb, 1999; Freund and Spatafora, 2005; Gupta, 2005; Schiopu and Siegried, 2006; Chami et al, 2008; Adams, 2009) , we expect real per capita income -which reflects the economic wealth of the host country of migrants -to be associated with higher remittances paid. Similarly a higher depth of financial development in the host-country of migrants would lead to higher flows of remittances sent from migrants' host countries to their homecountries. Concerning the real effective exchange rate, the expect impact on remittances paid could be ambiguous. On the one hand, an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, for an unchanged value of nominal remittances, would likely increase the real value of remittances sent from donor-countries. Remittances senders could also increase the nominal amount of remittances sent in a context of a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate so that the real (net) value of remittances sent would in fine increase. Overall, it is difficult to anticipate the impact of real effective exchange rate on remittances paid. Incidentally, higher unemployment rates could reduce the chances for migrants to find a job in their host country, and hence the amount of remittances that they can send back to home. At the same time, even in the situation of high unemployment, migrants might be willing to accept jobs that would not be accepted by the native people of the host-countries. Concerning the share of the stock of migrants of the total population, we expect a rise in this share to be positively associated with higher remittances paid. The inclusion of this variable in the model would not only help control for its effect on remittances paid, but as we will see later, it would also help examine the extent to which the effect of net aid transfers on remittances paid depends on the share of the stock of migrants in the total population.
Econometric strategy
To estimate model (1), we start with the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares estimator where standard errors are corrected by means of the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) technique to account for heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and contemporaneous cross-sectional dependence in the dataset. We henceforth refer to this estimator as "POLS-DK". The results of this estimation are reported in column [1] of Table 1 . We then move onto estimate the same model by means of the within fixed effects estimator where standard errors are also corrected by means of the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) technique. This estimator is henceforth denoted "FE-DK", and the outcome of the estimation is provided in column [2] of Table 1. However, the main problem with each of these two estimators is that they do not address the endogeneity problem associated with the reverse causality from remittances paid to donors' ODA flows. Indeed, as mentioned above, remittances paid flows can influence donors' total aid flows (see Bertoli et al. 2008; and Fuchs et al. 2014) , situation which would potentially generate an endogeneity bias in the current empirical analysis. To address this endogeneity problem, we draw from the literature on the determinants of donors' aid effort (see for example, the interesting survey provided by Fuchs et al. 2014 on the matter), and use in a fixed effects regression, a number of macroeconomic determinants of donors' development aid supply as instruments of the "NAT" variable. These instrumental variables include the government expenditure (% GDP) in the donor-country, denoted "EXPEND"; the total government revenue (% GDP) in a donor-country, denoted "REV"; the government's ideology, i.e., its political orientation, denoted "IDEOLOGY"; the existence of a system of checks and balances, denoted "CHECKS", and a system of polarization, denoted "POLARIZ". The description and source of each of these instrumental variables are provided in Appendix 1, while descriptive statistics on these variables are reported in Appendix 2. Note that the variable "EXPEND" has been calculated as the difference between overall government expenditure and the net aid transfers, in % GDP. The latter has been subtracted from the donor's overall government expenditure because "NAT" is part of overall government expenditure. The empirical literature on the determinants of ODA has shown that government expenditure and revenue, including the budget deficit are key determinants of donors' aid effort (ODA, in % GDP) (e.g., Faini, 2006; Bertoli, 2008; Gnangnon, 2013) . The degree of government polarization, and checks and balances reflect the divergence of interests in domestic politics and are expected to influence donors' aid budget (e.g., Fuchs et al., 2014) . Indeed, Round and Odedokun (2004) have argued that the aid budget would increase when incongruent ideologies are represented within a government (e.g., coalition of parties in power), the opposition is strong, and the system of checks and balances involves considerable veto power. In these conditions, higher aid could be the result of various diverging interests that need to be satisfied in the budget. Likewise, the political (ideological) orientation of governments (e.g., social-democrat versus libertarian-conservative) could influence donors' aid expenditure. For example, conservative governments may allocate more aid to promote national commercial interests, while progressive governments may provide a similar amount of aid for altruistic reasons (e.g., Round and Odedokun, 2004; Faini, 2006; Bertoli, 2008; Fuchs et al. 2014) .
Using these five instruments, we estimate model (1) by means of the fixed effects instrumental variable, namely the two-stage least squares (2SLS) within fixed effects approach (henceforth referred to as "FE2SLS"). It is worth underlining that standard errors are also corrected here using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) technique. The conclusions of the empirical analysis would primarily be derived from the estimations that use this estimator. The empirical analysis therefore proceeds as follows:
First, we estimate model (1) (using the "FE2SLS" approach) over the full sample, without taking into account the outliers identified in Figure 2 and highlighted in section 1. The results of this estimation are reported in column [1] of Table 2. Note that to save space, we have reported the results of the first stage regression in Appendix 3. Additionally, to save space, we have not reported the outcomes of the first stage regressions for the other subsequent estimations (described below), but present in the relevant tables the tests that help check the strength and validity of the instruments used in the regressions. These first stage regressions could be obtained upon request.
Second, we estimate another specification of model (1), which takes into account the effect of the outliers on the dependent variable. To do so, we construct a dummy variable (denoted "DUMOUTL"), which takes the value 1 for the identified outliers, and "0", otherwise. We then introduce this dummy variable, along with its interaction with the variable "Log(NAT)" in model (1). The resulting model specification is estimated by means of the 'FE2SLS' approach, and the outcome of this estimation is reported in column [2] of Table 2 . As the outliers concern situations where remittances paid (% GDP) are higher than 1% (i.e., the natural logarithm of remittances (% GDP) is higher than 0), and where remittances paid (% GDP) are lower than 0.135% (i.e., the natural logarithm of remittances (% GDP) is lower than -2), we deepen the analysis by examining how development aid affects remittances paid for cases where remittances paid (% GDP) are higher than 1%, and for cases where remittances paid (% GDP) are lower than 0.135%. This would help understand whether the effect of development aid on remittances paid depends on the category (among the two major groups of outliers) to which the countries belong. To do perform this analysis, we create two outlier-dummies (which are indeed the components of the dummy "DUMOUTL". The first dummy, denoted "DUMOUTLNEG" takes the value 1 if remittances paid (% GDP) are lower than 0.135%, i.e., if the natural logarithm of remittances (% GDP) is lower than -2. Concerned countries include Finland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. It is worth noting that it is not all the years of the considered period that these countries experience remittances paid (% GDP) lower than 0.135%. The second dummy, denoted "DUMOUTLPOS" takes the value 1 if remittances paid (% GDP) are higher than 1%, i.e., if the natural logarithm of remittances (% GDP) is higher than 0 (as per the right-hand side of Figure 2 ). Concerned countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland. It is also important to note here that it is not all the years of the considered period that these countries experience remittances paid (% GDP) higher than 1%. Each of the two dummies is interacted with the variable "Log(NAT)" in the model (1), and the two dummies along with their interaction variables are all introduced in model (1). The outcome of the estimation of this model specification by means of the 'FE-2SLS' estimator is presented in column [3] of Table 2 .
Third, as noted in Section 2, we examine whether and if so, to what extent the effect of development aid on remittances paid depends on the share of the stock of migrants in the total population of the host countries. To conduct this analysis, we estimate another variant of model (1) in which we introduce an interaction variable between the development aid and the share of migrants' stocks variables. The results of this estimation are provided in Table 3 .
Interpretation of empirical results
Across the three columns of the Table 1 , we observe that development aid does not influence significantly remittances paid at the 10% level. At the same time, estimates provided in column [3] of Table 1 show that for outliers, net aid transfers influences positively remittances paid, but the effect is significant only at the 10% level. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of the "DUMOUTL" variable suggests that net aid transfers exert a higher positive effect in countries where remittances paid (% GDP) are lower than 0.135% and higher than 1%, than in other countries. Focusing on results concerning control variables in column [3] (as these estimates stem from the estimation of model (1) taking into account fixed effects and the effects of outliers), we obtain that only real per capita income and financial development exert a significant effect (at the 10% level) on remittances paid. Specifically, these two variables influence positively remittances paid. However, as noted above these results especially the ones reported in columns [2] and [3] could be biased because of the potential endogeneity of the "NAT" variable. Table 2 , where estimates are unbiased as they stem from the estimation of model (1) that addresses the endogeneity of the "NAT" variable through the use of the 'FE2SLS' approach. We assess the strength of the set of instruments used in the FE2SLS regression by reporting at the bottom of all three columns of Table 2 Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value that corresponds to the notion that 15% is the maximal rejection rate that the researcher could tolerate if the true rejection rate is 5%. Results across the three columns show that the KP Wald F-statistic far exceeds the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value at 5% for instruments strength, thereby indicating that the instrumental variables are strong instruments for the "NAT" variable. Moreover, the SandersonWindmeijer (SW) first-stage Chi-Squared (and the associated p-value) are results of test of underidentification of the endogenous regressor, under the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressor is unidentified. Across the three columns of this Table, the statistics (and related p-values) reject the null hypothesis, thereby indicating that the endogenous regressor is over-identified, based on the instruments used in the regressions. In addition, the p-values associated with the Hansen-J statistic amounts are far higher than the 10% level across the three columns of Table 2 . These therefore suggest that the instrumental variables used in the analysis are valid, i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error term, and are correctly excluded from the estimated model. Overall, these diagnostic tests that help check the validity and strength of the instrumental variables are fully satisfactory. Turning to the estimates, we find from column [1] that donors' net aid transfers influence negatively and significantly (at the 1% level) remittances paid flows. This outcome is confirmed in column [2] of Table 2 when we take into account outliers, although the coefficient of the "Log(NAT)" variable in column [2] is slightly higher than that of column [1] of the same Table. At the same time, for outliers, the effect of development aid on remittances paid is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (see the coefficient of the interaction variable "DUMOUTL*Log(NAT)". It is worth recalling here that according to the descriptive statistics provided in Appendix 2, remittances paid (% GDP) range between 0.024% and 3.807%. Based on results in column [2], we conclude that for outliers, a 1 percentage increase in the ratio of net aid transfers to GDP leads to a rise in remittances paid to GDP ratio by 0.75 percentage. However, for nonoutliers (countries where remittances to GDP ratio is comprised between 0.135% and 1%), a 1 percentage increase in the ratio of net aid transfers to GDP leads to a 1.3% percentage decline in remittances paid-to-GDP ratio. Put differently, for non-outliers, there is a substitution effect between donors' aid and remittances flows sent from donor-countries, as when donors' aid supply declines, remittances increase, and vice-versa. In contrast, for outliers, development aid is complementary with remittances paid. Results concerning control variables (see column [2] ) indicate that positive drivers of remittances paid include a rise in the real per capita income, a higher depth of financial development, a depreciation of real effective exchange rate, and a higher unemployment rate. The surprisingly positive effect of unemployment rate on remittances paid may yet reflect differentiated effect across countries in the sample, but it could also indicate that the effect of development aid on remittances paid may be dependent on the prevailing level of unemployment rate in the host countries of migrants (here, donorcountries). We do not go deeper into this analysis, as it is not the main purpose of the current study. The share of migrants' stock in the total population does not exert any significant effect on the remittances paid by these migrants. This result probably indicates that the effect of development aid on remittances paid translates through its effect on migration flows (and hence the prevailing stock of migrants in a given year in the host country). Let us now turn to estimates provided in column [3] of Table 2 . We obtain that for non-outliers, development aid influences negatively and significantly (at the 1% level) remittances paid (see the coefficient of "Log(NAT)" variable). At the same time, among outliers, in countries where remittances paid (% GDP) are lower than 0.135%, net aid transfers exert a positive and significant effect (at the 1% level) (see the coefficient of the interaction variable "DUMOUTLNEG*Log(NAT)"). Specifically, in these countries, a 1 percentage increase in the ratio of net aid transfers to GDP is associated with an increase in remittances paid to GDP ratio by 1.12 percentage. However, for outlier-countries where remittances (% GDP) are higher than 1%, there is on average, no significant effect of development aid on remittances paid. Overall, these results tend to suggest that while for non-outliers (countries where remittances paid to GDP ratio is comprised between 0.135% and 1%), there is a substitution between development aid and remittances paid, for outliers, there is a complementarity between these two types of capital flows, although this complementarity seems to be driven by cases where remittances-to-GDP ratio is lower than 0.135% (for countries where remittances is higher than 1%, there is no significant effect of development aid on remittances paid).
Let us now turn to results presented in
We now consider the results reported in Table 3 . As noted above, they help examine the extent to which the effect of net aid transfers on remittances paid depends on the share of the stock of migrants in the total population in the host-countries. The results concerning the diagnostics tests that help check the validity and strength of instruments used in the regression are all fully satisfactory. In this Table, we are particularly interested in the interaction terms associated with the interaction variables, as well as with the coefficients of the variable "Log(NAT)". We note that the coefficient of the "Log(NAT)" is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, while concurrently, the interaction term associated with the interaction variable "[Log(STOCKMGR)]*[Log(NAT)]" is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Taking together, these two results suggest that for nonoutliers, the total effect of net aid transfers on remittances paid changes sign above a certain threshold of the share of stock of migrants in the host-country's total population. This threshold is given by 15.43% [= exponential (3.453/1.262)]. To recall, the share of migrants' stock in the host-country's total population ranges between 2.5% and 28.4%. This outcome therefore signifies that on average, for non-outliers, the effect of net aid transfers on remittances paid is positive for shares of stocks of migrants in the host-countries' total population lower than 15.43%, and negative for shares of stocks of migrants in the host-countries' total population higher than 15.43%. However, this outcome may not provide the full extent of the effect of development aid on remittances paid, as it represents an 'average' outcome over all non-Outlier-countries of the full sample. In fact, the effect of net aid transfers on remittances paid could exhibit various effects (including in terms of magnitude, statistical significance and sign of the estimated coefficient) across countries (non-outliers) in the full sample, for different shares of the stock of migrants in the hostcountry's total population. To get a better picture on this impact, we provide in Figure 3 , at the 95 per cent confidence intervals, the evolution of the marginal impact of "NAT" on "REMIT" for different shares of the stock of migrants in the host-country's total population (for non-outliers). It is important to underline that the marginal impacts that are statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence intervals are those encompassing only the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval that are either above or below the zero line. This Figure indicates that the marginal impact of net aid transfers on remittances paid could be positive or negative, and decreases as the share of the stock of migrants in the non-outlier host-country's total population countries increases. Specifically, the effect of development aid on remittances paid is positive and significant in those countries (among non-outliers) where the share of the stock of migrants in the total population is lower than 13.76% [= exponential (2.622093)]. For this set of countries, the magnitude of the effect of net aid transfers on remittances paid is yet positive, but it declines as the share of the stock of migrants in the total population increases. Put differently, for those countries, net aid transfers exert a higher positive effect on remittances paid in countries with lower share of stock of migrants in the total population than in countries with higher share of stock of migrants in the total population. For countries (among nonoutliers) that experience a share of the stock of migrants in the total population higher than 16.7% [= exponential (2.815537)], the effect of development aid on remittances paid is negative and significant, and the higher the value of this share, the higher is the magnitude of the negative effect of development aid on remittances paid. Thus, in nonoutlier countries where the share of the stock of migrants in the total population is higher than 16.7%, there is a substitutability effect between net aid transfers and remittances paid, and the degree of this substitutability increases as the value of the share of the stock of migrants in the total population rises. For countries (among nonoutliers) that experience a share of stock of migrants in the total population between 13.76% and 16.7%, there is no significant effect of development aid on remittances paid.
Turning to results concerning outliers in Table 3 , we obtain that the coefficient associated with the variable "[DUMOUTL*Log(NAT)]" is not statistically significant at the 10% level, whereas the interaction term related to the variable "[Log(STOCKMGR)]*DUMOUTL*[Log(NAT)]" is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. The combination of these two results leads to the conclusion that, on average, for outliercountries, net aid transfers influence positively and significantly remittances paid, whatever the share of migrants' stock in the population of the host-country. In addition, the higher this share, the higher is the positive effect of net aid transfers on remittances paid. As noted above, this 'average' outcome over the outliers may not fully reflect how net aid transfers affect remittances paid for various shares of migrants' stock in the total population of the host-country. To get a better picture on this effect, we display in Figure 4 , at the 95 per cent confidence intervals, the evolution of the marginal impact of "NAT" on "REMIT" for different shares of the stock of migrants in the host-country's total population for outliers in the sample. The graph shows that this marginal effect increases as the share of the stock of migrants in the host-country's total population increases. However, it is yet always positive, but not always statistically significant. In particular, this marginal effect is statistically significant only for shares of the stock of migrants in the host-country's total population higher than 11.9% [= exponential (2.47701) ]. Hence, outlier-countries that experience a share of migrants' stock in the host-country's total population higher than 11.9% experience a positive and significant effect of net aid transfers on remittances paid, and the higher the share, the greater is the positive effect of net aid transfers on remittances paid. At the same time, outlier-countries with a share of migrants' stock in the hostcountry's total population lower than 11.9% enjoy no significant effect of net aid transfers on remittances paid.
Robustness check analysis
To check the robustness of results concerning the effect of net aid transfers on remittances paid found in Table 2 , especially in columns [1] and [2] of this Table, we use another econometric estimator to estimate the related specifications of model (1) (i.e., model (1) that does not take into account outliers, and model (1) that takes into account outliers). In particular, we use the Error Component twostage least squares, referred to as "EC2SLS", developed by Baltagi (1981) . It is a random effects estimator with a matrix weighted average of the between 2SLS and fixed effects 2SLS approaches. It is particularly more efficient in small samples and outperforms the Generalized two-stage least square estimator (Baltagi and Liu, 2009 ). The same instruments used for the estimations with the FE2SLS approach are also employed here. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 4 . The p-values associated with the Sargan test of overidentification of all instruments are higher than 10% across the two columns of the Table, thereby indicating the validity of the instruments used in the regressions. We note from column [1] of this Table that net aid transfers affect negatively and significantly remittances paid. However, the coefficient of the "Log(NAT)" variable in column [2] (where outliers' effects are taking into account) of this Table more than doubles that of column [1] . Specifically, for non-outliers, a 1 percentage increase in the net aid transfers-to GDP-ratio leads to a 1.35 percentage fall in the ratio of remittances paid to GDP. This result is quite similar to the one obtained in column [2] of Table 2 . In contrast, for outliers, a 1 percentage increase in the net aid transfers-to GDPratio induces a 1.75 percentage increase in the ratio of remittances paid to GDP. Even though the magnitude of this effect is higher than the one obtained in column [2] of Table 2 for outlier-countries, the two effects go in the same direction, i.e., they are both positive and statistically significant at least at the 5% level. Overall, these findings confirm those of column [2] of Table 2 , although with different magnitudes. Results related to control variables in column [2] of Table  4 suggest that higher real per capita income and a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate exert a positive and significant effect on remittances paid. Incidentally, remittances paid to GDP ratio exhibits a rising trend, as exemplified by the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the "Trend" variable. The other control variables do not appear to influence significantly (at least at the 10% level) remittances paid. In particular, the lack of statistical significance of the effect of the share of migrants' stock (in the host-country's total population) on remittances paid probably reflects the fact that the effect of net aid transfers on remittances paid translates through the share of migrants' stock (in the host-country's total population).
Conclusion
In contrast with previous studies that have looked at the impact of development aid on remittances received by recipient (developing countries), this article examines the impact of the aggregate development aid supplied by donors on the remittances flows sent from donor-countries (remittances paid). The empirical analysis is carried out focuses on 21 donor-countries (host countries of migrants) over the period 2000-2015. It has shown evidence that donors' overall aid supply could exert a negative or a positive and significant impact on remittances paid, depending on the level of remittances-to-GDP ratio sent from host-countries (i.e., the donor-countries), as well as on the share of migrants' stock in the host-country's total population. Specifically, for countries where remittances paid to GDP ratio is comprised between 0.135% and 1%, development aid is a substitute to remittances paid, especially when the share of the stock of migrants in the total population is higher than 16.7%; the degree of this substitutability increases as the value of the share of the stock of migrants in the total population rises. This substitutability between net aid transfers and remittances paid could be interpreted by the fact that development aid reduces migration flows (hence the importance of the income channel relative to the budgetary constraint channel in the relationship between aid and migration), and consequently lead to lower remittances paid. However, when the share of the stock of migrants in the total population is lower than 13.76%, net aid transfers influence positively remittances paid, i.e., there is a complementarity between these two types of capital flows. For countries (among those with a ratio of remittances paid to GDP between 0.135% and 1%) that experience a share of stock of migrants in the total population between 13.76% and 16.7%, there is no significant effect of development aid on remittances paid. Considering now countries where the ratio of remittances paid to GDP is lower than 0.135% or higher than 1%, we find that net aid transfers influence significantly and positively remittances paid only for those countries where remittances paid (% GDP) are lower than 0.135%, as for the other countries, the effect is not statistically significant. Furthermore, for those countries with a ratio of remittances paid to GDP lower than 0.135% or higher than 1%, the effect of net aid transfers on remittances paid is statistically significant only when the share of migrants' stock in the host-country's total population is higher than 11.9%. This statistically significant effect is in effect positive, and increases as the share of migrants' stock in the host-country's total population rises. Note: *p-value < 0:1; **p-value < 0:05; ***p-value < 0:01. Robust Standard errors are in parenthesis. The variables "NAT" has been instrumented in the regressions by the following variables "IDEOLOGY", "EXPEND", "REV", "CHECKS", and "POLARIZ". Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional dependence, using Driscoll and Kraay (1998) technique. Note: *p-value < 0:1; **p-value < 0:05; ***p-value < 0:01. Robust Standard errors are in parenthesis. The variables "NAT" has been instrumented in the regressions by the following variables "IDEOLOGY", "EXPEND", "REV", "CHECKS", and "POLARIZ". Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional dependence, using Driscoll and Kraay (1998) technique. Note: *p-value < 0:1; **p-value < 0:05; ***p-value < 0:01. Robust Standard errors are in parenthesis. The variable "NAT" has been instrumented in the regressions by the following variables "IDEOLOGY", "EXPEND", "REV", "CHECKS", and "POLARIZ". As the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) technique could not apply here, we have introduced a trend variable in the regressions based on the EC2SLS approach.
